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Kjersti Nyborg Hov 
Executive summary 
 
The purpose of this thesis has been to estimate the New Keynesian Phillips curve 
relation using Norwegian data, and more precisely using survey expectations as 
instruments for the expected inflation term in the NPC to see how this would 
influence the results. As a comparison to the survey estimates I have estimated a 
replication of the Galí and Gertler (1999) study.  
The estimations using both survey expectations and the Galí and Gertler instruments 
turned out to be significant, and with the size and sign of the coefficients as expected. 
Based on my estimation the Galí and Gertler instruments provide a better fit model of 
the NPC than using survey expectations, however both methods are valid to estimate 
the NPC.  
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1 Introduction 
 
Inflation dynamics is a widely debated subject in modern macroeconomics. Since 
New Zealand started with inflation targeting as their monetary policy regime in 1988, 
several other countries has adopted the regime, and amongst them, Norway. 
Understanding the inflation dynamics in the short run has implications for how to 
conduct monetary policy and is thus of great interest. One of the objectives has been 
the New Keynesian Phillips curve (NPC). The NPC is a widely debated theory of 
inflation dynamics in the short run, and the conclusions about whether the NPC is a 
good approximation of short-run inflation dynamics are differing.   
One way to test the NPC is to use forwarded actual inflation as a proxy for expected 
inflation. Another approach is that of Roberts (1995). He used survey expectations as 
proxy for the expected inflation term in the estimation the NPC and compared this to 
estimates using forwarded actual inflation, and found that using survey expectations 
improved the fit of the NPC. As an explanation for why the survey expectations 
would make a more precise model, he said: “(..) survey response may be better 
measures of peoples expectations than are realized future prices” (Roberts 1995, p. 
976). Galí and Gertler presented a paper in 1999 testing the NPC theory on US and 
EU data. They concluded that the NPC was a good first approximation of short-run 
inflation dynamics. Their results have later been subject to further research, and the 
conclusions have been conflicting1. Norwegian studies of the NPC have often ended 
in a rejection of the NPC, or inconclusive results2.  
In the thesis I have estimated the NPC relation using both survey expectations and the 
same variables as Galí and Gertler (1999)3 as instruments for the expected inflation 
term. The NPC estimates proved to be significant for all of the instrument sets, 
although the impact from the variables have differed somewhat. Overall, the model 
that fits Norwegian data the best when testing the NPC theory are the instrument 
variables used in the Galí and Gertler (1999) paper. My results are contradictory to 

1 For a discussion of the Galí and Gertler (1999) findings, see for example Fuhrer (1997), and Galí, 
Gertler and López-Salido (2001) 
2 Se for example Bårdsen et. al (2002), Boug et. al (2006) and Nymoen et. al. (2008)  
3 The instrument set in this thesis consist of lags of CPI inflation, labor income share, output gap, wage 
inflation, long-short interest spread and commodity inflation.  
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the findings of Roberts (1995). His findings from using surveys showed that using 
survey expectations had a better fit than using forwarded actual inflation as proxies 
for the expected inflation term in the NPC. On the other hand, my findings coincided 
with his result in the respect that it did not matter much whose expectations were used 
as instruments. I did not find significant differences when using the survey 
expectations from different sectors as instruments, although excluding the inflation 
expectations from the household sector made a slightly better model fit. 
In the following, I will go through some of the literature regarding the New 
Keynesian Phillips curve and its origin in section 1. In section 2 the NPC baseline 
model will be derived. Section 3 is an assessment of the different variables used in the 
estimation. The data collection and a description of the different variables will be 
assessed in before we move on to the analysis in section 4. In the analysis part, a brief 
introduction to the methodology will be given before we move in to the results and 
the discussion of the results. In the end I will give some remarks about the thesis.  
 ͺ
2 The literature 
2.1 The historical development of the Phillips curve 
Alban William Phillips, who later gave the name to the Phillips curve, first introduced 
the Phillips curve in 1958 through the article: “ The relation between Unemployment 
and the Rate of Change of Money Wage Rates in the United Kingdom, 1861-1957” 
(Phillips, 1958). Phillips analyzed yearly data from the British economy in the years 
1861-1957 and found a non-linear inverse relationship between the unemployment 
rate and the growth rate of nominal wages. His findings were that the growth rate of 
wages was high when unemployment was low, and vice versa, but that the growth 
rate increased more when unemployment was low than it decrease when 
unemployment was high. The explanation of the negative correlation was that when 
unemployment was low, employers would bid up the price of labor to get the 
workforce they needed, resulting in higher overall wages. Workers were on the other 
hand not willing to work for decreasing wages when unemployment was high. The 
Phillips curve suggested that there was a trade-off between wage growth and 
unemployment. Samuelson and Solow found similar results using U.S. data, but they 
altered/modified the relation by trading nominal wage growth with the inflation rate. 
This is the relation that is associated with the name the Phillips curve today. The 
Phillips curve that described the relation between inflation and unemployment is 
described by: 
 
ߨ ൌ ߨ௘ ൅ ߚሺݑത െ ݑሻ 
 
where ߨ and ߨ௘  is inflation and expected inflation, and ݑ and ݑത  are the actual- and 
steady state unemployment rate, respectively. If expected inflation and the steady 
state unemployment rates are fixed, we find the inverse relationship between inflation 
and the unemployment rate. A lower unemployment rate than the steady state 
unemployment rate would lead to higher inflation. The inverse relation between 
unemployment and the inflation rate implied by the Phillips curve suggested that 
governments could lower the unemployment rate by accepting higher inflation for a 
period at the cost it entails. Governments could achieve this by increasing their 
demand to excess demand, thus causing inflation, but also lowering the inflation rate. 
 ͻ
The theory was accepted by many researchers, resulting in a general belief that the 
government could easily reduce unemployment at the cost of inflation. Given the time 
periods prior to 1958 when the article was presented, the Phillips curve relation was 
plausible, not only on British data, but also in other countries. However, thru the 
1970s the economic climate changes, and challenged the Phillips curve relation. 
Several countries experience both high inflation and high unemployment at the same 
time, called stagflation4, which violated the Phillips curve theory. Instead of the 
predicted negative correlation, countries now experienced a positive correlation 
between unemployment and inflation.  
 
One of the problems with the Phillips curve is that inflation expectations must be 
fixed for the relation and the trade-off to be valid. However, it is not realistic that 
individuals will have fixed inflation expectations. If the government for example were 
running high inflation by increasing their demand for a longer period to lower the 
unemployment rate, the individuals in the economy would, after getting used to the 
higher inflation level, be likely to alter their inflation expectations to fit the new 
inflation level. This would lead to higher inflation expectations even though the 
unemployment rate was still the same. This was one of the arguments put forward by 
Milton Friedman (1968) against the original Phillips curve.  
  
Friedman also criticized the Phillips curve for using nominal variables, and argued 
that it is the real variables (i.e. real wages) that influence economic behavior, not 
nominal variables (nominal wages). As a response to the Phillips curve by Samuelson 
and Solow, Friedman (and Phelps) brought forward the term “natural rate of 
unemployment” which is the unemployment rate to witch we have no inflationary or 
deflationary pressure. The insight of a natural rate of unemployment motivated the 
NAIRU-model5. Friedman (1968) emphasized that this natural rate is not a fixed rate 
for all times, but could change given the economic environment at the time.  
 

4 Stagflation is a term for an economic environment that experiences both inflation and stagnation at 
the same time. Many countries suffered from stagflation in the 1970s.  
5 NAIRU is an acronym for Non-accelerating rate of unemployment, which is the rate of 
unemployment that neither increase or decrease inflation  
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2.2 The New Keynesian framework  
The NPC is an improved version of the NAIRU-model, and it is based on a micro 
foundation, meaning that aggregated supply and aggregated demand is a result of 
firms maximizing profit and households maximizing utility given their budget 
constraint. This gives rise to an optimization of behavior for individuals, called 
agents, in the economy. The NPC is based on a loss function, and the calculation is 
thus based in a micro foundation. The micro foundation is one of the main features in 
the New Keynesian framework, and was initiated by Kydland and Prescott (1982)6. 
Their influence in modern macroeconomic modeling, especially the micro foundation 
in macroeconomic modeling earned them the Nobel price in 20047.  
 
The New Keynesian framework, which the NPC is founded on, is a belief that there 
are nominal rigidities in wages and prices in the short run. Given nominal rigidities in 
the short run, government and monetary policy can influence real economic variables 
in the economy, helping production reach an optimal level in the short run. Another 
feature is the belief in rational expectations. The individuals make optimal decisions 
based on their information set at the time. The optimal behavior will change as they 
get new information. Given rational expectations, the individuals will not make 
systematic mistakes.  
 
The key elements in the NPC used in the thesis are monopolistic competition, 
nominal rigidities and short run non-neutrality of monetary politics (Galí 2008).  
Monopolistic competition means that firms, represented by private agents, set 
individual prices on goods and inputs on their differentiated goods. The agents exhibit 
maximizing behavior given a loss function. The second element in the NPC is that the 
agents experience nominal rigidities. There are constraints imposed on price 
adjustments, either by constraints on frequencies on price adjustments, or because 
they experience costs when changing prices. Menu costs are cost firms experience 
when changing the prices, as for example costs of physically changing the prices-tags 
or changes in magazines that go out to the public.  The constraints on when firms can 

6 Kydland and Prescott was rewarded the Nobel Price in 2004 based on their contribution to micro 
founded macroeconomic modeling. Readers are directed to the original paper, Kydland and Prescott 
(1982): ”Time to build and aggregate fluctuations”. 
7 For a brief introduction to the works of Kydland and Prescott and the rationale for the Nobel Price, 
see the article: “Nobelprisen tildelt intertemporal makroøkonomi” in Økonomisk Forum, Nr.8, 2004 by 
Espen Henriksen and Kjetil Storsletten 
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adjust the prices are in this model in line with the Calvo price model (1983) of 
staggered prices. Only a fraction of firms can adjust their prices in any given period, 
the remaining firms must wait until next period or periods after. The third main 
element in the NPC is a result of the nominal rigidities. Since firms are experiencing 
nominal rigidities, the monetary policy is non-neutral in the short run. The change in 
interest rates, imposed by either monetary policy or changes in money supply, is not 
matched one-by-one in expected inflation giving rise to changes in the real interest 
rate. This has effect on the real economy since the agents in the economy, both firms 
and households, will alter their behavior.  
 
The main difference between the old Phillips curve and the New Keynesian Phillips 
curve of today is different forcing variables. The former unemployment growth rate 
has been replaced by the real marginal costs8, and the NPC is forward looking. The 
NPC expresses that inflation today is affected by real marginal costs and expected 
future inflation.  
 
3 The baseline model 
 
In this section I will derive the baseline model as it is used in Galí and Gertler (1999). 
This model has the standard New Keynesian framework with a micro foundation. 
 
3.1 Deriving the baseline model 
In the baseline model, agents are assumed to optimize behavior given their 
preferences and budget constraints. The optimization problem we wish to minimize is 
the discounted deviation from the optimal prize, ݌௧ା௞. Future prices are not known at 
the time of optimization, therefore we need to replace actual prices with expectations. 
The loss function we wish to minimize can be shown as:  
 

8 It is also common to use a measure of output gap instead of real marginal costs, but as Galí and 
Gertler (1999) showed, this can make spurious result. See Galí and Gertler (1999) for a discussion of 
the use of marginal costs as driving variable.  
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, where 
 
݌௜ǡ௧ାଵ is the price for a representative firm, denoted ݅, at time ݐ, and ݌௧כ is the 
optimal price at time ݐ, hence the expression in the paranthesis displays deviations 
from optimal price at their respective time periods. As shown above, the deviations 
are squared, hence both the upside and downside deviations from optimal price are 
treated equally as losses. The parameter ߠ is the set probability that a firm must keep 
its prices for the next period, and ߚ is the discount factor that calculates the present 
value of future losses of deviations from optimal prices.  
The intuition is that, starting at time ݐ, we want to minimize deviations from optimal 
price (݌כ), and we take into consideration the ability to either change the price or not 
during a period. The first term ሺ݌ െ ݌כሻ is, for the representative firm ݅, the difference 
of the price at time ݐ (݌) and the optimal price at time t (݌כ). The following terms 
represent the future expected deviations from optimal price in their representative 
years. Since we are assuming the Calvo (1983) pricing model, every firm has a fixed 
probability (ͳ െ ߠ) that it can change the price during that period, and thus a fixed 
probability of ߠ that it must keep its price unchanged throughout the period. As hown 
in Eq. (1), the deviation from the optimal price is due to the fact that we have this 
fixed probability of not being able to change the prices throughout the period. With 
fully flexible prices, we would not have had this problem since then the firms would 
have been able to change their prices to the optimal price as the real marginal costs 
change. Since we have the fixed probability of some firms not being able to change 
their prices during a period, the actual price may deviate from the optimal price 
during that period. The loss function we wish to minimize is hence the expected 
discounted deviations from optimal price from this period and periods to come:  
 
ܮ ൌ ଵଶ ܧ௧ σ ߠ
௞ஶ
௞ୀ଴ ߚ௞ሺ݌௜ǡ௧ െ ݌௧ା௞כ ሻଶ( 2 ) 
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The first order condition (F.O.C) is obtained by differentiating Eq. (2) conditional on 
the price at time ݐ:  
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Since , ,t i t i tE p p , we get: 
 
݌௜ǡ௧ σ ߠ௞ஶ௞ୀ଴ ߚ௞ െ σ ߠ௞ஶ௞ୀ଴ ߚ௞ܧ௧݌௧ା௞כ ൌ Ͳ( 3 ) 
 
Eq. (3) is the F.O.C. for optimal price at time t. In the following, the subscript i will 
be omitted since we assume that all firms are equal, hence the equations are based on 
a representative firm. By using the expression for an infinite geometric series, 
σ ߠ௞ߚ௞ஶ௞ୀ଴ ൌ
ଵ
ଵିఏఉ, we can rewrite the optimal price function at time ݐ  (Eq.3) to: 
݌௧
ை௣௧௜௠௔௟ ଵ
ଵିఏఉ െ σ ߠ
௞ߚ௞ஶ௞ୀ଴ ܧ௧݌௧ା௞כ ൌ Ͳ. 
 Rearranging and multiplying this by ሺͳ െ ߠߚሻ , gives us the new optimal price 
function: 
 
݌௧
ை௣௧௜௠௔௟ ൌ ሺͳ െ ߠߚሻσ ߠ௞ߚ௞ஶ௞ୀ଴ ܧ௧݌௧ା௞כ ( 4 ) 
 
Further we find the optimal price in the next period, i.e. the F.O.C. for period ݐ ൅ ͳ. 
Since the prices in the next period is unknown we need to use an expectation-term, 
which gives us: 
ܧ௧݌௧ାଵ
ை௣௧௜௠௔௟ ൌ ሺͳ െ ߠߚሻ෍ߠ௞ߚ௞ܧ௧݌௧ାଵା௞כ
ஶ
௞ୀ଴
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Multiply this equation by TE  and rearrange the equation gives the expected optimal 
price at time ݐ ൅ ͳ:  
 
ߠߚܧ௧݌௧ାଵ
ை௣௧௜௠௔௟ െ ߠߚሺͳ െ ߠߚሻσ ߠ௞ߚ௞ܧ௧݌௧ାଵା௞כஶ௞ୀ଴ ൌ Ͳ( 5 ) 
 
Eq. (5) sums up to zero, thus we can add Eq. (5) to the right side of Eq. (4). The term 
ሺͳ െ ߠߚሻ is a common factor; hence the expression can be written as ݌௧
ை௣௧௜௠௔௟ ൌ
ሺͳ െ ߠߚሻሾσ ߠ௞ߚ௞ܧ௧݌௧ା௞כஶ௞ୀ଴ െ ߠߚ σ ߠ௞ߚ௞ܧ௧݌௧ାଵା௞כஶ௞ୀ଴ ሿ ൅ ߠߚܧ௧݌௧ାଵା௞
ை௣௧௜௠௔௟ . The 
expression in the brackets equals ݌௧כ, which gives: 
 
݌௧
ை௣௧௜௠௔௟ ൌ ሺͳ െ ߠߚሻ݌௧כ ൅ ߠߚܧ௧݌௧ାଵ
ை௣௧௜௠௔௟( 6 ) 
 
The aggregated price level is given by: 
 
݌௧ ൌ ሺͳ െ ߠሻ݌௧
ை௣௧௜௠௔௟ ൅ ߠ݌௧ିଵ( 7 ) 
 
Where ሺͳ െ ߠሻ is the fixed probability of firms that are able to change their prices to 
the optimal price during the period, and ߠ is the fixed probability of the firms that 
need to keep the same price as last period regardless of changes in marginal costs. 
The aggregated price level for period ݐ ൅ ͳ can be found by using an expectation-term 
since we do not know the actual price in the next period: 
ܧ௧݌௧ାଵ ൌ ሺͳ െ ߠሻܧ௧݌௧ାଵ
ை௣௧௜௠௔௟ ൅ ߠ݌௧ 
Solving for ܧ௧݌௧ାଵ
ை௣௧௜௠௔௟, gives the expected optimal price in period ݐ ൅ ͳ: 
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ܧ௧݌௧ାଵ
ை௣௧௜௠௔௟ ൌ ଵଵିఏ ܧ௧݌௧ାଵ െ ߠ݌௧( 8 ) 
 
Eq. (8) can then be put in expression for the optimal price at time ݐ, namely Eq. (6): 
 
݌௧
ை௣௧௜௠௔௟ ൌ ሺͳ െ ߠߚሻ݌௧כ ൅
ఏఉ
ଵିఏ
ሺܧ௧݌௧ାଵ െ ߠ݌௧ሻ( 9 ) 
 
Eq. (9) is then put in the expression for the aggregated price level (Eq. (7)): 
݌௧ ൌ ሺͳ െ ߠሻ ൤ሺͳ െ ߠߚሻ݌௧כ ൅
ߠߚ
ͳ െ ߠ ሺܧ௧݌௧ାଵ െ ߠ݌௧ሻ൨ ൅ ߠ݌௧ିଵ 
 
Solving by opening up the brackets and the parenthesis gives the equation that 
determines the price level: 
 
݌௧ ൌ ሺͳ െ ߠሻሺͳ െ ߠߚሻ݌௧כ ൅ ߠߚܧ௧݌௧ାଵ െ ߠଶߚ݌௧ ൅ ߠ݌௧ିଵ( 10 ) 
 
Further, we assume imperfect competitive markets, i.e. the markets are influenced by 
monopolistic competition. In imperfect markets as monopolistic competition, the 
firms set their optimal price to cover expected marginal costs plus an extra premium 
that is computed by a share of the marginal cost. In nominal terms:  
݌௧כ ൌ
ߝ
ͳ െ ߝܯܥ௧
௡ 
Here, 
t
nMC  is the nominal marginal costs and the ఌଵିఌ is the premium.  
Monopolistic competition occurs when firms have some form of market power, thus 
they have the opportunity of setting the price higher than needed to cover the 
marginal costs. There are few pure perfect markets, and it is common to believe all 
markets have some form of monopolistic competition, although in various degrees. 
When firma are setting prices they must consider the expected future increase in 
wages and other factors that will affect their margins. Since the firms do not know the 
outcome of the wage settlement, they must use their expectation of the outcome. The 
firms facing some form of monopolistic power set a price a little higher than expected 
marginal costs; hence the price is the marginal cost plus a premium9.  The effect of 
monopolistic competition is that the quantum produced is less and the price of the 
goods produced will be higher than what would have been the price under efficient 
market equilibrium. This also means that the firms have some spare capacity; they can 
increase production without having to increase their price. Hence, under monopolistic 
competition there are more flexibility than for a perfect market, and the firms are 
therefore less affected by changes in the marginal costs. 
Figure 1 shows the economic effects of monopolistic and perfect competitive markets. 
Under perfect competition, the firms’ prices will equal their marginal costs, while 
under monopolistic competition we experience a dead weight loss because the prices 
are set higher than marginal cost, i.e. not economically optimal. 
 
Figure 1: Perfect competition and monopolistic competition 
 
 
 

9 Read more about monopolistic competition and price setting decisions in Steigum (2006) 
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Taking logs of the expression above gives us: 
݌௧כ ൌ  ቀ
ఌ
ଵିఌቁ ൅ ݈݊ܯܥ௧
௡( 11 ) 
Defining ߤ ൌ ݈݊ ቀ ఌଵିఌቁ and ݈݊ܯܥ௧
௡ ൌ ݌௧ ൅ ݉ܿ௧ , where ݉ܿ௧  is real marginal costs in 
log-form.  This last expression comes from the fact that nominal marginal costs can 
be written as ܯܥ௧௡ ൌ
ெ஼೟೙
௉೟
כ ௧ܲ. Since real marginal costs equal nominal marginal costs 
divided by the price, this expression makes us able to write Eq. (11) as: 
 
݌௧כ ൌ ߤ ൅ ݌௧ ൅ ݉ܿ௧( 12 ) 
 
Using the expression above, Eq. (12), and inserting it in Eq. (10), we get: 
 
݌௧ ൌ ሺͳ െ ߠሻሺͳ െ ߠߚሻሾߤ ൅ ݌௧ ൅ ݉ܿ௧ሿ ൅ ߠߚܧ௧݌௧ାଵ െ ߠଶߚ݌௧ ൅ ߠ݌௧ିଵ( 13 ) 
 
Rearranging Eq. (13), gives:   
݌௧ ൅ ߠଶߚ݌௧ െ ߠ݌௧ିଵ
ൌ ሺͳ െ ߠሻሺͳ െ ߠߚሻሾߤ ൅ ݉ܿ௧ሿ ൅ ሺͳ െ ߠሻሺͳ െ ߠߚሻ݌௧ ൅ ߠߚܧ௧݌௧ାଵ 
 
݌௧ െ ݌௧ሺͳ െ ߠሻሺͳ െ ߠߚሻ ൅ ߠଶߚ݌௧ െ ߠ݌௧ିଵ
ൌ ሺͳ െ ߠሻሺͳ െ ߠߚሻሾߤ ൅ ݉ܿ௧ሿ ൅ ߠߚܧ௧݌௧ାଵ 
 
݌௧ሺͳ െ ሾሺͳ െ ߠሻሺͳ െ ߠߚሻሿ ൅ ߠଶߚሻ െ ߠ݌௧ିଵ
ൌ ሺͳ െ ߠሻሺͳ െ ߠߚሻሾߤ ൅ ݉ܿ௧ሿ ൅ ߠߚܧ௧݌௧ାଵ 
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݌௧ሺͳ െ ሾͳ െ ߠߚ െ ߠ ൅ ߠଶߚሿ ൅ ߠଶߚሻ െ ߠ݌௧ିଵ
ൌ ሺͳ െ ߠሻሺͳ െ ߠߚሻሾߤ ൅ ݉ܿ௧ሿ ൅ ߠߚܧ௧݌௧ାଵ 
 
݌௧ሺͳ െ ͳ ൅ ߠߚ ൅ ߠ െ ߠଶߚ ൅ ߠଶߚ ൌ ሺͳ െ ߠሻሺͳ െ ߠߚሻሾߤ ൅݉ܿ௧ሿ ൅ ߠߚܧ௧݌௧ାଵ 
 
݌௧ሺߠߚ ൅ ߠሻ െ ߠ݌௧ିଵ ൌ ሺͳ െ ߠሻሺͳ െ ߠߚሻሾߤ ൅ ݉ ௧ሿ ൅ ߠߚܧ௧݌௧ାଵ 
 
ߠ݌௧ െ ߠ݌௧ିଵ ൅ ݌௧ߠߚ ൌ ሺͳ െ ߠሻሺͳ െ ߠߚሻሾߤ ൅ ݉ܿ௧ሿ ൅ ߠߚܧ௧݌௧ାଵ 
 
݌௧ െ ݌௧ିଵ ൌ ߚܧ௧݌௧ାଵ െ ݌௧ߚ ൅
ሺͳ െ ߠሻሺͳ െ ߠߚሻ
ߠ ሾߤ ൅ ݉ܿ௧ሿ 
 
݌௧ െ ݌௧ିଵ ൌ ߚሾܧ௧݌௧ାଵ െ ݌௧ሿ ൅
ሺଵିఏሻሺଵିఏ ሻ
ఏ
ሾߤ ൅ ݉ܿ௧ሿ( 14 ) 
 
Since the variables are all in logs, the inflation is defined as ߨ௧ ൌ ݌௧ െ ݌௧ିଵ. Inserting 
this in Eq. (14) gives: 
ߨ௧ ൌ ߣ݉ܿ௧ ൅ ߚሾܧ௧ ௧ାଵሿ ൅ ߮ 
  
Where: ߣ ؠ ሺଵିఏሻሺଵିఏఉሻఏ  and ߮ ؠ ߤ
ሺଵିఏሻሺଵିఏఉሻ
ఏ   
Eq. (15) is the inflation-equation we wish to estimate. Galí and Gertler are using this 
expression in their study, but with the marginal cost parameter being percentage 
deviation from steady state. Making the expression being deviation from steady state, 
we can write (15) as: 
 ͳͻ
ߨො௧ ൌ ߣ݉ෞܿ ௧ ൅ ߚܧ௧ሼߨො௧ାଵሽ( 15 ) 
 
Where the ^ subscript reflects deviation from steady state. By iterating Eq. (15) 
forward, we get: 
 
ߨො௧ ൌ ߣσ ߚ௞ஶ௞ୀ଴ ܧ௧ሼ݉ෞܿ ௧ା௞ሽ( 16 ) 
 
As shown in Eq. (17) the theory suggests that inflation, measured as price deviation 
from steady state, is the present value of future expected marginal costs.  
 
3.2 Marginal cost in the model 
Marginal costs are the increase in costs of producing one more unit. Producing an 
extra unit is profitable as long as the marginal revenue from producing one more unit 
is higher than the marginal cost. When marginal costs and marginal revenue is equal 
we have equilibrium, hence the optimal production. In competitive market 
equilibrium, the price would equal the marginal cost, and we would get optimal 
production.  
Marginal costs are not observable because it differs across the aggregated firms, so 
the marginal cost of the representative firm in this model framework will not be 
observable. Marginal costs are thus calculated using other measures. In Gali og 
Gertler (1999) the labor income share is used as the measure of the firms real 
marginal costs. They consider a simple Cobb-Douglas production function:  
 
௧ܻ ൌ ܣ௧ܭ௧
ఈೖ
௧ܰ
ఈ೙( 17 ) 
 
They assume that real marginal costs are given by the rate real wage divided by the 
marginal product of labor:  
 ʹͲ
ܯܥ௧௥ ൌ
ௐ೟ ௉೟ൗ
డ௒೟
డே೟൘
( 18 ) 
 
Eq. (18) is a standard expression from microeconomics, which is only a rewritten 
expression of the fact that in optimum, the real wage will equal the value of the last 
unit of labor, i.e. the marginal product of labor, MPL 10.   
Given Eq. (17) MPL is: 
 
ܯܲܮ ൌ డ௒೟డே೟ ൌ ܣ௧ܭ௧
ఈೖߙ௡ ௧ܰ
ఈ೙ିଵ ൌ ߙ௡ܣ௧ܭ௧
ఈೖ ே೟
ഀ೙
ே೟
ൌ ఈ೙௒೟ே೟ ( 19 ) 
 
Inserting Eq. (19) in Eq. (18) gives:  
 
ܯܥ௧௥ ൌ
ௐ೟ ௉೟ൗ
ఈ೙௒೟ ே೟ൗ
ൌ ଵఈ೙ כ
ௐ೟ே೟
௒೟௉೟
ൌ ଵఈ೙ כ ݏ௧ ՜ ܯܥ௧
௥ ൌ ௌ೟ఈ೙( 20 ) 
 
Where ܵ௧ is the labor income share, where ܵ௧ ൌ
ௐ೟ே೟
௒೟௉೟
. We can see from the Eq. (20) 
that real marginal costs are proportional with the labor income share. In the following, 
lower key letters displays the percentage deviation from steady state.  
 
݉ܿ௧ෞ ൌ ݏ௧( 21 ) 
 
Gali and Gertler (1999) then use the conditions above in their baseline model: 
By inserting the relation in Eq. (21) in Eq. (15), gives: 

10 Pindyck and Rubinfeld (2005) 
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ߨො௧ ൌ ߣݏ௧ ൅ ߚܧ௧ሼߨො௧ାଵሽ( 22 ) 
 
Eq. (22) is therefore the relation used for estimating the NPC using survey 
expectations and the Galí and Gertler instrument 
 
4 The data  
 
Estimations of the NPC relation, Eq. (15), was performed by using different 
instrument sets for the expected inflation term. The first estimation used survey 
expectations as instruments for the expected inflation term, from a survey conducted 
by the Central Bank of Norway. This is a quarterly survey where one of the questions 
is the expected future inflation 12 months ahead. The four groups included in the 
survey are economy experts from academia, leaders in the labor unions, business 
leaders and the household sector. The second estimation used the instruments that 
Galí and Gertler (1999) used in their estimation, namely 4 lags of inflation, labor 
income share, output gap, wage inflation, long-short interest spread and commodity 
inflation11.  
The data used for the model that replicates the testing for the NPC by Galí and Gertler 
are quarterly data for Mainland-Norway for various series in the period 1978:1-
2011:4. Data for wage inflation calculations starts from 1996:1, hence the time span 
of the Galí and Gertler instrument set is 1996:1-2010:4. The survey conducted by the 
Central Bank of Norway started in the first quarter of 2002, and is performed 
quarterly, therefore the time span of the survey-model is 2002:1-2010:4.  

11 Galí and Gertler (1999) used the percent change in the GDP deflator, while I have used the 12-month 
growth in the CPI as the inflation measure.  
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4.1 Inflation 
The inflation variable, ߨ௧, is the 12-month growth in the consumer price index (CPI). 
Ideally the 12-month growth in the CPI-ATE12 or CPIXE13 should have been used as 
the inflation measure, but observations for CPI-ATE and CPIXE are only available 
from 2002:4 and 2008:3, respectively, and could therefore not be used, as the time 
periods would be too short for the analysis. The CPI is available on Statistics 
Norway’s webpages, table 0301314. 
Figure 2 shows the actual inflation measured by the CPI, over the period 1980-2010, 
and displays several distinct economic periods in Norway15. In 1980 and 1981 we see 
the aftermath of the revolution in Iran in 1979, and the following Iranian-Iraqi war in 
1980 that resulted in a steep increase in the oil prices. The price of oil tripled during 
this period, giving the oil nation Norway increasing revenues to the state, which in 
turn gave rise to increasing inflation. The following years the inflation rate declined, 
until Norway again entered a new economic era, the so called “yap’e time”, followed 
by high inflation16. Since the discovery of oil in Norway in the early 1970s and the oil 
crisis’ in 1973 and 1979/1980 that both led to steep increases in the oil price, the 
revenue to the government had risen sharply. High government revenue from the oil 
fields together with low government set nominal interest rate gave rise to a credit 
boom (Grytten 2003). The banks were lending out large sums of money, and prices 
were rising, especially asset prices. The boom came to a sudden end when oil prices 
fell in 1986, leading to a sharp drop in government revenue, together with a tightening 
of monetary policy. The years to follow were characterized by banking crisis. The 
results were an increasing number of bankruptcies, increasing unemployment rates, 
and declining asset prices.  
The 1990s started slow with the aftermath from the banking crisis, but after 1993-
1994 the economy started to recover. The banking crisis was a Norwegian 
phenomenon and not an international banking crisis, which lead to a competitive 

12 CPI-ATE is CPI adjusted for tax changes and excluding energy products 
13 CPIXE is CPI adjusted for tax changes and excluding temporary changes in energy prices 
14 Statistics Norway, StatBank, table 03013: Konsumprisindex 
15 For a brief overview of the distinct periods in the Norwegian business cycle 1980-2005, see 
Samfunnsspeilet nr. 5-6, 2007, by Statistics Norway 
16 In Norwegian the time period in the mid- to late 1980s was called ”jappe-tiden”, coming from the 
English acronym YAP, meaning Young Aspiring Professional.  
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advantage for Norwegian firms. We can see the expansionary phase in figure 2 as a 
slow and steady upturn in inflation.  
In March 2001 Norway changed the monetary policy regime to inflation targeting. 
The inflation target was set to be 2,5 % growth in the consumer prices in the medium 
term17. After an increase in inflation in early 2002, reaching a top of inflation of 4,5 
%, the central bank needed to increase the key policy rate to reduce the inflationary 
pressure. The Norwegian economy experienced a drawback in late 2002, early 2003. 
The drawback came as a result of both weak economy amongst Norway’s trading 
partners, and a weakening in the Norwegian economy with low production and 
increasing unemployment18. The drawback in the economy resulted in a decreasing 
inflation. In addition, the water reservoirs were unusually full during 2003 leading to 
low energy prices. The Norwegian economy is sensitive to energy prices, and the 
sharp decline in energy prices during 2003 turned into a decline in the CPI. The next 
year, 2008, the energy prices were at its normal levels, thus making the 12-month 
growth from in CPI 2007-2008, high. Figure 2 displays a steep fall in CPI inflation in 
2003 with a following increase in 2004, but as we now know, this was partly due to 
the unusually low energy prices in 2003. This shows how the CPI can be a poor 
measure of underlying inflation since it is affected by the energy prices that are very 
volatile (Nordbø 2008)19.  
The weak economy during the early 2000s resulted in a lowering of the key policy 
rate. The central bank started to cut the key policy rate in December 2002, and kept 
cutting the rate at almost every board meeting until March 2004 in an attempt to boost 
the Norwegian economy20. The attempt was successful and the inflation started to 
increase again from the low point in 2003. As mentioned above, some of the effect of 
the inflation came from the normalization of the energy prices. The increase in 
inflation however, lasted until the financial crisis hit in 2008.  As we will see later, the 
inflation on Norwegian produced goods were higher than figure 2 indicates. Norway 

17 Read more about the history of the Central Bank of Norway at their webpage, available from URL: 
http://www.norges-bank.no/en/about/history/norges-banks-history/ 
18 Speech by former Governor for the Central Bank of Norway, Svein Gjedrem, at Centre for Monetary 
Economics/Handelshøyskolen BI, June 3rd 2003, available at: Penger og kreditt 2/03, Norges Bank 
19 Read more about different inflation measures in Nordbø (2008) in Norges Bank Staff Memo 2008/7 
20 A summary of when changes have been made to the key interest rate is available at the Central Bank 
of Norway’s webpages, available from URL: http://www.norges-bank.no/en/price-stability/monetary-
policy-meetings/key-policy-rate/key-policy-rate-monetary-policy-meetings-and-changes-in-the-key-
policy-rate/  
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experienced deflation on imported goods in this period, and since the CPI is a 
measure of the overall price level in the country, the deflation on imported goods 
pushed down the overall inflation.  
The effect of the financial crisis is clearly visible in figure 2 as a distinct drop in 
inflation. A note should be made that Norway did not experience disinflation in this 
period. Norway was not hit as hard as first expected, and as we can see from the 
figure, the inflation seems to have picked up after the crisis and is getting closer to the 
inflation target of 2,5 %.  
 
Figure 2: The 12-month growth in CPI. 1980-2010 
 
 
Overall from the time when the inflation targeting was set in effect in March 2001, 
Norway has experienced volatile inflation, but the variation has been less volatile than 
the inflation in the a priori decades. Using a 10-year average to smoothening the 
variability of inflation makes a better picture of the changes in the inflation volatility. 
As we see from figure 3, after the inflation targeting was set in effect the volatility in 
inflation has decreased. Intuitively this should make it easier for individuals in the 
economy to predict future inflation.   
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Figure 3: CPI. 10-year moving average1) and variation2). 1980-2011 
 
Source: The Central Bank of Norway21  
 
4.2 The output gap 
The output gap is a measure used to describe business cycles. It is a measure of 
whether the activity in the economy is higher or lower than a steady state activity 
level. The gross domestic product (GDP) is the value of total production output in the 
economy; accordingly it is an indicator of the overall activity. The steady state value 
of production is the level that gives steady state inflation, and is called potential 
output, or equivalently the trend level of production. The difference between actual 
output and the steady state output is the output gap, consequently it is an indication on 
how well the economy is doing compared to steady state. A positive output gap is an 
indicator of the pressure in the economy, and therefore an indicator on inflation-
pressure. The problem with the output gap is that GDP levels are revised long after, 

21 Monetary Policy Report 1/11, chart 1.10, page 12 
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making it a poor measure of the activity at the present time period. The output gap is 
defined as:  
ܱݑݐ݌ݑݐ݃ܽ݌ ൌ  ሺܩܦ ௔ܲ௖௧௨௔௟ሻ െ ሺܩܦ ௣ܲ௢௧௘௡௧௜௔௟ሻ 
The data series used to calculate the output gap is GDP fixed for Mainland-Norway, 
measured by market value over the period 1978:1-2010:422. The GDP series has been 
seasonally adjusted using X-12-ARIMA23. The steady state level of production is not 
observable, and must be calculated to find the output gap. One way to calculate the 
steady state level, and consequently the output gap, is to use a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) 
filter24. The HP-filter is a univariate method, i.e. a method that only uses information 
from the GDP series itself when calculating potential production. The method 
calculates potential production that minimizes the deviation of actual production from 
potential production.  
ܯ݅݊ሼݕ௧כሽ௧ୀଵ் ሼσ ሺݕ௧ െ ݕ௧כሻଶ ൅ ߣσ ሾሺݕ௧ାଵכ െ ݕ௧כሻ െ ሺݕ௧כ െ ݕ௧ିଵכ ሻሿଶሽ்ିଵ௧ୀଶ்௧ୀଵ ( 23 ) 
where ݕ௧ is actual production (GDP) and ߬௧ is potential production (potential GDP). 
The first part of Eq. (23) is the difference between actual GDP and potential GDP, 
squared, in effect the output gap. Since it is squared both positive and negative 
deviations from the potential output are given the same weight. The second part of the 
equation is a measure on changes in the trend, thus also deciding the size of the output 
gap. The weight put on the second part is defined by the parameter ߣ. The value of ߣ 
decides how smooth we want the output trend to be: whether the trend should follow 
actual production (GDP) closely, or if it should be more of a linear trend. If ߣ ൌ Ͳ, 
only the first part of Eq. (23) is focused on when minimizing; hence the trend follows 
the actual production series exact, i.e. ߬ ൌ ߣ. If this were the case we would not have 
experienced business cycles since the output gap would be zero. The other extreme is 
if ߣ ൌ λ. In this case the first part of Eq. (23) lose all effect, and the trend would be 
linear. Clearly this is not realistic either. The output gap was made using the same 
smoothing parameter used by Statistics Norway, ߣ ൌ ͶͲͲͲͲ (Bjørnland et. al. 2004). 

22 GDP fixed prices, market value. Statistics Norway, StatBank, table 06127: “Makroøkonomiske 
hovedstørrelser” 
23 X-12-ARIMA is available for download at U.S. Census Bureau, URL: 
http://www.census.gov/srd/www/x12a/  
24 Read more about the different measures of the output gap, and the features of the HP filter at 
Bjørnland et.al. (2004) in Penger og Kreditt 4/04 
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Figure 4 show the GDP compared to its trend level, calculated by the HP filter using a 
smoothing parameter of 40 000. The deviation between the GDP series and the trend 
GDP is the output gap.  
 
Figure 4: GDP fixed and GDP trend. HP-filter, smoothing parameter ࣅ ൌ ૝૙૙૙૙ 
 
 
A disadvantage of calculating potential production and the output gap by the HP-filter 
is the endpoint issues25. The filter is two-sided, which means that observations from 
both ݐ െ ͳ and ݐ ൅ ͳ are used when calculating the potential output at time ݐ. At the 
beginning of the series we do not have any information of the value before the first 
observation, and in the end of the series we have no information about future 
production. Only current and future information is available for the computing the 
trend at the beginning of the series, and only past and current information is available 
for calculating the trend at the end of the series. In either fringe the trend is therefore 
more influenced by actual production than in the rest of the series. To remedy a part 
of the endpoint issues, a prediction of future GDP was made for the period 2011:1-
2011:4 by using the forecasts of GDP growth presented by the Central Bank of 

25 Read more about issues regarding the HP filter in Sørensen &Whitta-Jacobsen (2005), ch.14 
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Norway in their Monetary Policy Report 2011/1. Since the GDP series ends at 2010:4, 
by using the predicted GDP values, the endpoint issue at the end of the series is 
smoothed out. The GDP series starts in 1978:1, and since the length of the data used 
in the analysis starts in 1996:1, also the endpoint issue in the beginning of the series is 
smoothed out.  Another concern about the HP filter is a lack of theoretical foundation. 
The HP filter theory merely states that potential production is the trend, and that 
potential production is the production we would get if prices and wages had been 
fully flexible.  
 
Figure 5 display the output gap predicted by the HP filter with a smoothing parameter 
of 40 000. We can clearly see the expansionary phase in the mid 1980s, and the 
following downturn from the banking crisis in the late 1980s that carried on into the 
early 1990s. Output spiked in 1986 and resulted in the highest positive output gap of 
the period 1978 to 2010. It is also distinctive how the banking crisis in the late 1980s 
affected the Norwegian economy for several years after, resulting in a negative output 
gap. The turning point after the crisis came in 1996, ten years after the oil price 
dropped and the banking crisis (Grytten 2003). The downturn because of the financial 
crisis in 2008 is also distinct with a sudden shift from positive to a negative output 
gap in the second half of 2008. 
 ʹͻ
Figure 5: The output gap 
 
 
Comparing the output gap in figure 5 to the inflation in figure 2 show that there is a 
strong link between the output gap and inflation. When there is pressure in the 
economy, production will increase, and thus leading to inflation. The output gap is a 
common indicator of inflationary pressure.  
 
4.3 Wage inflation 
 
The wage inflation variable is calculated by taking the 12 month growth in the 
seasonally adjusted total wage cost series, over the period 1995:1-2010:4. The wage 
cost series is found in table 06173 at Statistics Norway’s webpages26.  
Table 6 clearly shows the expansionary period from the mid-1990s up until the so-
called dot.com and 9/11 crisis in the beginning of the 21st century. The increase in 
wages was low during the difficult years and had a low point in 2003. The growth in 
wage inflation was relatively steep from the low point in 2003 up until the financial 

26 Statistics Norway, table 06173: ”lønn og sysselsetting, etter næring” 
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crisis hit. One of the explanations is the decreasing unemployment rate during this 
period. The unemployment rate was 3,5 % in 2005, but fell to 1,7 % in 200827. In 
2008 the financial crisis hit, and as we can see from figure 6 wage inflation dropped 
sharply from 12,5 % to 1 % during the 12 months from mid-2008 until mid-2009.  
 
Figure 6: Wage inflation 
 
 
The theory of the original Phillips curve proclaimed a stable inverse relationship 
between the rate of unemployment and the wage inflation (Steigum 2006). Although 
this theory is rejected in its original form, the insight of the theory still stands 
regarding labor market theories.  
Price inflation will make the income for the individuals in the economy pay for less 
than it otherwise would if the prices had stayed the same, i.e. the money lose 
purchasing power when the prices of goods and services increases. The loss of 
purchasing power of the paycheck workers receive for their work will in turn be 
compensated for by increasing the wages for the workers. To which scale the workers 
will be compensated for the price inflation, hence loss in purchasing power, depends 
on what labor unions agree upon during wage settlements. Former Governor of the 

27 Statistics Norway, StatBank, table 06900: “Registrerte arbeidsledige, etter kjønn. Årsgjennomsnitt 
(present) (k)” 
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Central Bank of Norway, Svein Gjedrem, pointed out that the low growth in wages 
during 2003 could be a result of 2003 being a year with midterm-negotiations and not 
the main settlement (Gjedrem 2003). 
Amongst other issues as to how different types of work are valued in society, wage 
settlements depend largely on expected inflation. The increase in wages that worker 
unions and others are trying to settle on should in part reflect the loss of purchasing 
power caused by increasing prices. Since future inflation is not known, the labor 
unions on both the employers and the employees side must make their own prognosis 
on how they believe the prices will change in the short term, in effect settle on new 
wages that will close to fully compensate for inflation. In an economy with low 
unemployment, there is usually a shortage of skilled workers to be hired, and workers 
have greater bargaining power over the labor unions in wage settlements, making an 
upward pressure on wages. When the unemployment rate is high, the employers have 
the upper hand, thus making a downward pressure on wage growth.  
 
4.4 Unit labor costs 
The labor income share is a measure of unit labor costs, i.e. how much of the total 
production output in a country goes to paying for the production input labor. GDP 
Mainland-Norway is the measure of total output, and the total labor cost is the 
measure of the cost of the production input labor. The labor income share is used both 
as the measure of marginal costs, ݏ௧, but it also used as an instrument variable as a 
measure of unit labor costs in the testing of the NPC. The labor income share is 
calculated by taking the percentage difference between wage cost and the gross 
domestic product; hence it is the relative cost of labor measured by total costs of labor 
compared to total income measured by the GDP.  
The wage cost series is total wage cost for Mainland-Norway, presented quarterly 
from 1995:1-2010:4, available from StatBank at Statistics Norway’s webpages, table 
0617328. The wage cost series has been seasonally adjusted using X-12-ARIMA. The 

28 Statistics Norway, StatBank, table 06173: “Lønn etter sysselsetting, etter næring” 
 ͵ʹ
GDP series are seasonally adjusted GDP for Mainland-Norway in basic value, 
quarterly data from 1978:1-2010:429. 
Figure 7 shows the relative cost of labor measured as total wage cost divided by total 
output (GDP). From the period 1995-2010, the wage share has increased from about 
52 % to 57 %. The increase in unit labor cost has not been steep, but is sows that 
almost 60 % of total output from production goes to paying for the production input 
labor.  
 
Figure 7: The labor income share 
 
 
To get a better picture of the actual development, we need to look at both how wages 
and total output has developed in the same period. The wage inflation was high and 
increasing during the late 1990s, before it started to slow down in the early 2000 as 
shown by figure 6. From figure 7 we can see that unit labor costs was at its second 
highest in the end of the 1990s for the whole time period. The total production was 
low during the early start of the 1990s, cf. the output gap in figure 5. Total production 
was rising in the second part of the 1990s, but as we can see from chart 7, wage cost 
increase more than total production. During the difficulties in the early 2000s, labor 
unit cost sunk. At this time wage inflation was low, and is the most likely reason for 

29 Statistics Norway, StatBank, table 06128: “Makroøkonomiske hovedstørrelser. Sesongjustert” 
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unit labor cost decreasing at this point. Production was also suffering from the 
difficulties in the early 2000s.  
There was pressure on labor unions not to demand higher wages since the economy 
was in a stall. When the economy started to pick up speed again, we experienced high 
wage inflation, and unit labor costs were again increasing.  The low unemployment 
rate in this period increased labor unions positions, making wages increase. The unit 
labor costs have been increasing since the low point in 2005. The financial crisis in 
this chart is not easy to spot, which is to be expected since both wage costs and total 
production both dropped steeply in this period, making the relative relationship the 
same as before.  
Using unit labor cost as an instrument for expected inflation is intuitive given the way 
unit labor cost affect total production through costs. When unit labor costs increase, a 
larger share of the value of total production are used to finance the production input 
factor labor. An increase in unit labor cost also means that the cost of labor has 
increased relative to output, i.e. the firm are getting less output per krone paid for 
labor than earlier. When the cost level of production increases relative to output, the 
prices are likely increase so the firm can finance the higher cost level and still keep its 
margins.  
 
4.5 Commodity price inflation 
The commodity price inflation is a measure of changes in prices on consumer goods 
that do not include rent and services. The consumer price index (CPI) for goods and 
services by delivery sector was used to calculate two commodity price inflation 
indexes: one index for inflation in Norwegian produced goods only, and another index 
that also includes inflation on imported goods.  The CPI index for goods and services 
are divided into sub-indexes by delivery sector; “agricultural products”, “fish 
products”, “other consumer goods produced in Norway”, “imported consumer 
goods”, “rent” and “other services”, and their representative weights. Using all of the 
sub-indexes besides “rent” and “other services” makes up the commodity price index. 
 ͵Ͷ
The CPI by delivery sector series is available at SSBs webpages, table 0336330. Base 
year for the CPI by delivery sector is 1998 (1998=100).  
 
4.5.1 Making short term indexes from the sub-indexes 
Each of the sub-indexes is split into short term-indexes, where July each year is set to 
10031. This allows for relative price differences over time, hence we are able to 
compare the years relative to each other. Setting July = 100 isolated each year’s price 
changes, in other words variations in prices during year t do not affect variations in 
prices in year t+1, and so forth. Table 1 displays how the short-term index is made for 
the agricultural products. The same procedure has been done for each of the other 
sub-indexes; fish products, other consumer goods produced in Norway, and imported 
goods.   
 
As we can see from table 1 and figure 8, the short-time index re-starts at the value of 
100 each July; hence we can see how the prices have changed within each year 
without effects from the other years interfering. In figure 8 we can see the short-term 
index for agricultural products compared to the original agricultural products index, 
where the original index has the base value 1998=100.  

30 SSB, table 03363: ”Konsumprisindeks for varer og tjenester, etter leveringssektor (1998=100)” 
31 Statistics Norway change the weights of the sectors in CPI in July each year, see Rodriguez & 
Haraldsen (2005) in Økonomiske Analyser 4/2005 
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Table 1: Short-time index for agricultural goods 
Date CPI agricultural 
goods 
Calculation Short term index 
(S.I) 
December 2002 106,8 ܥܲܫ஽௘௖଴ଶ
ܥܲܫ஽௘௖଴ଶ
כ ͳͲͲ ൌ 100 
January 2003 107,5 ܥܲܫ௃௔௡଴ଶ
ܥܲܫ஽௘௖଴ଶ
כ ͳͲͲ ൌ 100,655 
February 2003 108,3 ܥܲܫி௘௕଴ଶ
ܥܲܫ஽௘௖଴ଶ
כ ͳͲͲ ൌ 101,404 
: : : : 
July 2003 111 ܥܲܫ௃௨௟଴ଶ
ܥܲܫ஽௘௖଴ଶ
כ ͳͲͲ ൌ 103,933 
August 2003 109,7 ܥܲܫ஺௨௚଴ଶ
ܥܲܫ௃௨௟଴ଶ
כ ͳͲͲ ൌ 98,829 
September 2003 111,1 ܥܲܫௌ௘௣௧଴ଶ
ܥܲܫ௃௨௟଴ଶ
כ ͳͲͲ ൌ 100,090 
 
Figure 8: Short-term index and CPI sub-index for agricultural products 
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4.5.2 Making short term indexes into a chained index 
To make a chained index that will become the commodity price indexes, the short-
term indexes first need to be weighted together. The short-term indexes for each 
delivery sector are weighted together by their representative weights given in Table 
03362 by SSB. The weighted index for Norwegian produced goods is:  
ሺݏǤ ݅Ǥ ܽ݃ݎ݅ כ ݓ݄݁݅݃ݐܽ݃ݎ݅ሻ ൅ ሺݏǤ ݅Ǥ ݂݅ݏ݄ כ ݓ݄݁݅݃ݐ݂݅ݏ݄ሻ ൅ ሺݏǤ ݅Ǥ ݋ݐ݄݁ݎ כ ݓ݄݁݅݃ݐ݋ݐ݄݁ݎሻ
ݓ݄݁݅݃ݐܽ݃ݎ݅ ൅ ݓ݄݁݅݃ݐ݂݅ݏ݄ ൅ ݓ݄݁݅݃ݐ݋ݐ݄݁ݎ  
Here, ݏǤ ݅Ǥ  = the short time index for the representative sectors. Adding imported 
goods to the formula makes the weighted index for Norwegian produced goods and 
imports imported goods, which is the basis for the second commodity price inflation 
variable.   
The weighted short-term indexes make the basis for calculating the chained index for 
the commodity price inflation; one for Norwegian produced goods only and a second 
one that includes imported consumer goods. The chained index will re-index the 
weighted short-term indexes, in other words reversing the short-term indexing done in 
the first step, so we get a new index with base year 1979 = 100. When calculating the 
chained index, the index will be equivalent to the short-term index during the first 
year of the series until July the same year, and then it is re-indexed in August 1979 
against July the same year (1979). In the following ݄ܿ = chained index and ݏǤ ݅Ǥ = 
short-term index. The formula for making the chained index is:  
 
݄ܿǤ ͳͻ͹ͻܣݑ݃ ൌ ݄ܿǤ ͳͻ͹ͻܬݑ݈ݕ כ
ݏǤ ݅Ǥ ͳͻ͹ͻܣݑ݃
ͳͲͲ  
݄ܿǤ ͳͻ͹ͻܵ݁݌ݐ ൌ ݄ܿǤ ͳͻ͹ͻܬݑ݈ݕ כ
ݏǤ ݅Ǥ ͳͻ͹ͻܵ݁݌ݐ
ͳͲͲ  
ǣ 
݄ܿǤ ͳͻͺͲܬݑ݈ݕ ൌ ݄ܿǤ ͳͻ͹ͻܬݑ݈ݕ כ
ݏǤ ݅Ǥ ͳͻ͹ͻܬݑ݈ݕ
ͳͲͲ  
݄ܿǤ ͳͻͺͲܣݑ݃ ൌ ݄ܿǤ ͳͻͺͲܬݑ݈ݕ כ
ݏǤ ݅Ǥ ͳͻͺͲܣݑ݃
ͳͲͲ  
 ͵͹
ǣ 
݄ܿǤ ͳͻͺͳܬݑ݈ݕ ൌ ݄ܿǤ ͳͻͺͲܬݑ݈ݕ כ
ݏǤ ݅Ǥ ͳͻͺͳܬݑ݈ݕ
ͳͲͲ  
݄ܿǤ ͳͻͺͳܣݑ݃ ൌ ݄ܿǤ ͳͻͺͳܬݑ݈ݕ כ
ݏǤ ݅Ǥ ͳͻͺͳܣݑ݃
ͳͲͲ  
 
The chained index describes the historical development of the price of Norwegian 
produced goods in CPI, and the historical development of the price in Norwegian 
produced goods and imports in CPI. Each of the new indexes has base year 1979 = 
100.  
Figure 9 shows that the index of Norwegian produced goods is increasing at a higher 
rate than the index for Norwegian produced and imported goods, making it apparent 
that the price development of imported goods has dampened the development of the 
total price level. Intuitively this makes sense since Norway has experienced large 
revenues from the petroleum industry since oil was discovered in the 1970s, pushing 
up the prices on other domestic consumer goods. Imported inflation has been low 
since Norway has been able to import cheap goods from Asia and other countries, 
both because Asia are producing at a low cost level, but also because the Norwegian 
exchange rate has been high making the products relatively cheaper (Gustavson and 
Vinje 2009).  
 ͵ͺ
Figure 9: Commodity price index: Norwegian produced goods only, and Norwegian produced 
goods and imports. 1979=100 
 
 
 
4.5.3 Commodity price inflation 
Taking the 12-month growth in the chained indexes for Norwegian produced goods 
and Norwegian produced and imported goods gives the inflation in the two 
commodity variables. As shown in figure 10, the inflation in Norwegian produced 
goods is more volatile than the inflation when including the imported goods. It is also 
clear that the inflation in imported goods have dampened the inflationary pressure for 
Norwegian consumer goods. We can see that this is particularly true throughout the 
2000s.  
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Figure 10: Commodity price inflation 
 
 
The price development on consumer goods produced in Norway compared to 
imported goods has moved in opposite directions. Most of the imported goods have 
had a declining inflation or even deflation, while the Norwegian produced consumer 
goods has had a steeper inflation pattern.  
The cheap imports made it look as if the pressure in the Norwegian economy was less 
than it actually was.  The Central Bank of Norway started their hike in the sight 
deposit rate in June 200532. As we can see from figure 10, the inflation on commodity 
goods produced in Norway had been high in the years leading up to this, but using the 
index where imported goods are included show that the total inflation on commodity 
goods has been low. The commodity price inflation is not the measure of underlying 
inflation, but it gives an indication on price developments on Norwegian produced 
and imported goods.  
The reason for using two different measures of the commodity price inflation is to see 
whether it makes a difference on the results on how well the NPC fit Norwegian data. 
It seems plausible that the commodity inflation variable that includes imports will 
make a better instrument for expected inflation than the variable without imported 
goods. As we can see from figure 11, the commodity variable that includes imports is 

32 Historical changes in the sight deposit rate, available at the Central Bank of Norway’s webpages, 
URL: http://www.norges-bank.no/no/prisstabilitet/rentemoter/styringsrenten/styringsrenten-oversikt-
over-rentemoter-og-endringer-i-styringsrenten-/ 
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less volatile, and follows actual inflation better than the commodity variable with 
Norwegian produced goods only.  
 
Figure 11: CPI inflation and the two commodity inflation measures. Per cent 
 
 
4.6 Long-short interest spread 
The long-short interest rate spread is the difference between the 10-year Government 
bond and the 3-month NIBOR33. The 10-year Government bond and the 3-month 
NIBOR rates are available at the Central Bank of Norway’s webpages34.  
If there are high inflation expectations in the long run, the individuals holding the 
long-term bonds want a high compensation for lending out the money, hence a higher 
interest rate. The rate of the 10-year Treasury bond largely depends on the economic 
outlook, both regarding risk and inflation. The 3-month NIBOR is the short time 
interest rate in the interbank market, and reflects the situation in the money market in 
the short run35. A high spread between the short- and long-run interest rates is an 
indicator of future inflation expectations. Tighter monetary policy leads to rising 

33 NIBOR is the Norwegian Inter Bank Offered Rate 
34 10-year Government bonds is available at URL: http://www.norges-bank.no/en/price-
stability/interest-rates/government-bonds-yield-monthly-average-of-daily-quotes/. 3 month NIBOR is 
available at URL: http://www.norges-bank.no/en/price-stability/interest-rates/nibor-nominal-interest-
rate-monthly-average-of-daily-observations/  
35 For a thorough introduction to interest rate measures, readers are directed to Bernhardsen (2011) in 
Staff Memo 4/2011 
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short-term interest rates. Tightening the monetary policy on the other hand, will 
usually lead to lower inflation in the future, thus lower rates will follow. The long-
term interest rates will thus not increase as much as the shorter-term interest rates, and 
the long-short interest spread will decrease (Estrella and Trubin, 2006).  
As we can see from figure 12, the economic outlook during the late 1980s and the 
beginning of the 1990s was poor. The short-term rates were higher than the long-term 
interest rates in this period, which indicates that the individuals holding the bonds did 
not expect an increase in inflation. During the 1990s the economic outlook changed, 
and the interest rates on bonds of longer maturities increased. This is an indication of 
increased expected future inflation. This coincides with the discussions above 
regarding the economic periods in Norway.  
Also the expansionary phase leading up to the financial crisis is clear. In the 
beginning of the 2003, the key policy rate was cut on a regular basis to help improve 
the Norwegian economy. When the economy started to recover and inflation started to 
increase, the central bank had to start adjusting by increasing the key policy rate. The 
central bank started to increase the key policy rate from June 2005. The sharp drop in 
the long-short interest spread in 2003 reflects the poor economic outlook at the time. 
The reduction of the key policy rate improved the outlook as this was meant to 
improve the economy, making the long-short interest rate spread turning positive and 
increasing. The spread was high during the following expansionary phase, reflecting 
the higher inflation expectations. The increase in the key policy rate starting in 2005 
once again showed that the inflation expectations got reduced, and the spread 
contracted.  
 
 Ͷʹ
Figure 12: The long-short interest spread 
 
 
4.7 Survey from the Central Bank of Norway 
The Central Bank of Norway performs quarterly surveys on inflation expectations, 
expectations on wage movements and interest rate movements. The survey is 
performed by Perduco on behalf of the Central Bank of Norway, and is published 
both on the Central bank of Norway’s webpages and the Perduco’s webpage36. The 
length of the series is the 2002:1-2011:1. The four groups of individuals responding to 
the survey are economy experts in academia and the financial industry, members in 
higher positions in workers’ unions (both employer and employee unions), business 
leaders and individuals in households. The questions from the survey used in the 
testing of the NPC are the question about the expectations for the 12-month growth in 
the consumer price index (CPI). The questioning varies among the groups according 
to their level of economical understanding, getting answers that reflect their 
expectation on inflation37. Extreme observations are left out of the survey.  
The questions the survey participant receives are direct questions on their 
expectations of inflation 12 months ahead and should therefore represent the actual 
inflation expectations of the individuals. The participants in the survey are a 
representative sample of individuals in the economy and should display the broad 

36 For a full review of the surveys, see the Central Bank of Norway’s webpages, available at URL: 
http://www.norges-bank.no/no/prisstabilitet/forventningsundersokelse/  
37 The survey questions are attached in the Appendix 
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inflation expectations. The survey is divided into four groups of individuals in various 
sectors in the economy. The participants use all available information past and present 
when making their forecasts on future inflation.  
 
4.7.1 The economy experts 
The economy experts consist of economic experts in two different work fields: 
economic experts in academia (universities and colleges), and economic experts in the 
financial industry. The survey goes out to the same group of people with some minor 
changes in the members due to who is employed at the moment of the survey. The 
data was collected by Perduco through the web tool Confirmit, and was sent to the 
respondents via e-mail. The survey present observations from the two expert sectors 
separately, together with a total score based on weighted averages of the two. In the 
thesis it is the combined score that is used as the expectations variable for the 
economic experts.  
It is reasonable to believe that the economy experts, both in academia and in the 
financial industry, would make the most accurate forecasts among the sectors 
represented in the survey. They have knowledge about economic relations and the 
implications of movements in key figures, and should on the basis of their knowledge 
be able to make reasonably predictions on future inflation. Figure 13 shows the 
relation between actual inflation and the inflation expectations of economy experts in 
academia and the financial industry. The figure has been created by forwarding the 
observations of expected inflation one period ahead to make the expectations line up 
with actual inflation at the time. It is somewhat surprising to see that the inflation 
expectations of the economy experts do not follow actual inflation more closely. Up 
until the financial crisis hit, the inflation expectations displayed little variability even 
though it is clear that actual inflation were very volatile in the same period. During 
the financial crisis the inflation expectations fell abruptly, and leveled out at a lower 
point.  Again it looks as the inflation expectations have found a new steady path, 
though on a slightly lower level than before the financial crisis.  
 ͶͶ
Figure 13: Actual inflation and inflation expectations by the economy experts 
 
 
4.7.2 Labor unions: Employer and employee organizations 
The labor unions participants consist if individuals from both the employer and the 
employees side, but will in the following be referred to as the labor union. In the 
survey, both employer and employee organizations are represented and the 
observations are presented separately and combined based on their weights. In this 
thesis, it is the combined expectations of labor unions that are used as the expectations 
variable for the labor unions. As for the economy experts, the data was collected by 
Perduco through the web tool Confirmit, and was sent to the respondents via e-mail. 
The participants from the labor unions sector are, as well as economy experts, likely 
to have inflation expectations that are close to actual inflation given their positions in 
wage settlement. One of the objectives in the negotiations is to compensate workers 
for their purchasing power loss from inflation. Being able to predict future inflation is 
thus an important task for the negotiations, and the outcome of the wage settlements. 
The members of the labor unions must therefore look at economic key figures and 
make forecast based on those. Hence, it is plausible to believe that participants from 
the labor unions sector will have expectations that are closely linked to actual 
inflation.  
As we saw with the economy experts, also inflation expectations of the labor union 
members are less volatile than actual inflation. Comparing figure 13 with figure 14 
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shows that labor union expectations follow the expectations of economy experts 
closely.  
 
Figure 14: Actual inflation and inflation expectations from the labor unions sector 
 
 
4.7.3 Business leaders 
The respondents among business leaders have changed during the years the survey 
has been performed. From 2002 until 2009, only business leaders of Norwegian firms 
with 50 or more workers could participate. From 2009:1 business leaders in 
Norwegian firms with 20 or more workers participates in the survey. The survey 
displays results separately for the business leaders of 20+ and 50+ workers, and a 
combined score for the group as one. The combined score was used as the inflation 
expectations for business leaders in the testing of the NPC. The respondents in this 
group, the business leaders, have increased from about 300 respondents to about 500 
respondents, making it a broader measure. The panel of business leaders are recruited 
through Perducos quarterly “business survey” (Norges næringslivsundersøkelser – 
NNU). The results are weighted based on region, industry and the number of 
employees in the firm.  
Business leaders need information about the economy and the outlook of the economy 
to make business decisions that maximize the firms’ profits both in the short and long 
run. Knowing the economic outlook and how to adapt to its surroundings is crucial to 
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make the business successful. One of the factors business leaders need to take into 
consideration when optimizing production is the inflation. The cost level increases 
when the prices on production input factors increase, both labor and products needed 
in the production. Inflation will in this regard affect the price setting decisions of the 
firms.  
Compared to both economy experts and labor unions, the business leaders might be 
more influence by inflation expectations in their respective business sectors than the 
overall inflation. The business leaders need to consider the prices they are faced in 
their business, and the overall inflation might be of less considerations. In this regard, 
the inflation expectations might follow actual inflation less than the expectations of 
economy experts and labor unions.  
Looking at chart 15 shows that the expectations of the business leaders follow the 
expectations of economy experts and labor unions, but the expectations are a slightly 
more volatile. The general level of inflation expectations is also generally a little 
higher than that of both economy experts and labor unions. 
  
Figure 15: Actual inflation and inflation expectations by business leaders 
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4.7.4 Households 
Respondents from the household sector are a representative sample of individuals 
aged 15 or older. 60 % of the interviews are done by housing telephones, and 40 % is 
done by cell phones. A total of 1004 interviews are carried out in the household 
sector, and the results are weighted based on region, age and gender. The interviews 
are done by telephone (CATI), and are performed by Norstat Norge on behalf of 
Perduco. 
Households are the sector in the survey-sample that is the least likely out of all the 
sectors in the survey to make accurate forecasts on inflation. This is not to say that 
they do not make inflation expectations that follow actual inflation, but given their 
level of expertise in economic analysis, they are the least experienced group on the 
field regarding economic behavior and economic key figures. On the other hand, 
participants from the household sector face changes in inflation on a regular basis 
regarding consumption and wages, and should therefore be able to predict inflation.  
Looking at expected inflation from the household sector compared to the forecasts by 
economy experts and actual inflation in figure 16, reveals that households over-
evaluates inflation by approximately 1 percentage points compared to the economy 
experts on average.  
 
Figure 16: Actual inflation and inflation expectations from economy experts and households 
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Given table 13-16 it is clear that inflation expectations by economy experts, labor 
unions, business leaders and households are less volatile than actual inflation. This 
means that even when experiencing large fluctuations in actual inflation, individuals 
do not alter their expectations in the same respect. Inflation expectations do not seem 
to vary as much with actual inflation as we would have expected, but on the other 
hand, the expectations are varying with inflation, thus being correlated to the expected 
inflation. In this respect, expected inflation from the survey should be valid 
instruments for the expected inflation variable in the NPC model.  
 
4.7.5 Shortcomings in the survey 
The sample from the survey is small due to the short period of available data. The 
testing of the NPC using survey data is thus not robust, but will give an indication of 
the fit of the NPC when survey expectations are used as the instrument of expected 
inflation. Since the series is short, the testing should be conducted again when more 
data is available. The survey data are based on individuals answering the survey, and 
has the typical shortcomings of surveys (Gripsrud et. al. 2007).  
The most likely error in this survey would be measurement errors that occur when 
participants do not understand the questions as intended, or participants deliberately 
giving untruthful answers. The problem with misconception of the questions are most 
likely to happen in the household sector as participants from this sector have the least 
knowledge of economic variables and -relations compared to the other sectors. One 
that is not familiar with the term inflations, CPI and 12-month growth would have 
trouble predicting actual inflation. Another concern pointed out by Roberts (1995) is 
that individuals in the survey might have little incentive to make thoughtful answers.  
 Ͷͻ
5 Analysis 
 
All estimates in the analysis were significant and showed that the NPC theory fit 
Norwegian data.  In this section I will go through the results from my estimations, and 
I will start by giving a brief introduction to the methods used in the analysis. The 
results from the use of survey instruments will be presented first before I go through 
the results of the use of Galí and Gertler instruments, and then compare the two. In 
the end of the analysis I will briefly discuss the robustness of my findings, and a 
discussion of whether to include a constant term or not in the regression.  
 
5.1 The methodology 
5.1.1 Instrument variables regression 
The NPC equation of inflation consists of both inflation today and expected inflation. 
The inflation equation we wish to estimate is38:   
ߨ௧ ൌ ߣݏ௧ ൅ ߚܧ௧ሺߨ௧ାଵሻ 
Testing this relation using actual inflation as a measure of expected inflation will 
cause serial correlation. This is a violation of the time series assumption number 5, no 
serial correlation, causing the output not to be testable using standard hypothesis 
testing. The time series assumptions are equivalents to the Gauss-Markow 
assumptions for panel data, and are a set of assumptions that must hold to make 
inference about a tested relation when using ordinary least square (OLS) as the 
estimator.39 If one of the five assumptions is violated, we cannot use standard testing 
methods as t- and F-tests to make inference. Actual inflation as a measure of expected 
inflation will cause serial correlation, the variable will be endogenous and the 
standard errors will be incorrect; hence we must use a different approach to make 
inference. A method well known to avoid the problems of serial correlation is to use 
instrument variable (IV) regression and two stage least square (2SLS) instead of OLS 
regression. The IV regression method use one or more variables that are instruments 

38 All variables are log deviations from steady state 
39 Read more about time series inference in Woolridge (2009), chapter 10-12 
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for the original variable that we wish to estimate40. The intuition behind IV regression 
is that the variation in original variable comes from two separate parts; one part that is 
correlated with the error term, ݑ, and another part that is not correlated with ݑ. The 
part that is correlating with the error term is the problematic part that causes serial 
correlation, and is the part we wish to isolate and not use in the testing. The second 
part of the variation, the one that is not correlated with the error-term, is the one we 
wish to keep and use in the testing of the relation. The two conditions for a valid 
instrument, ܼ௜, for the variable we wish to estimate, ௜ܺ, is (1) instrument relevance: 
ܿ݋ݎݎሺܼ௜ǡ ௜ܺሻ ് Ͳ , and (2) instrument exogeneity: ܿ݋ݎݎሺܼ௜ǡ ݑ௜ሻ ൌ Ͳ . The first 
condition ensures that the instrument variable is correlated with the instrumented 
variable meaning some of the variation in the instrument is related to the variation in 
the instrumented variable. The second condition ensures that the instrument variable 
does not correlate with the error term, thus being exogenous.  
Using instrumented variables, we can estimate the inflation equation by the 2SLS 
estimator. The first step is to regress the original variable, actual inflation lead by 1, 
on all the instrument variables we have. The second step is to use the predicted values 
from the first step as the variable for expected inflation in the inflation equation.  
 
5.1.2 Generalized Methods of Moments 
Another approach to estimate the inflation equation, Eq. X, is to use the Generalized 
Methods of Moments (GMM) estimator41. Under rational expectations, individuals 
will use all information available to form optimal expectations. They will not make 
systematically wrong prognosis/forecast mistakes when predicting the future value of 
an economic variable since they use all information available, in other words all 
errors in the prognosis are random. Related to the inflation equation, the prognosis 
mistake for ߨ௧ାଵ will be, under the assumption of rational expectations, uncorrelated 
with information dated at time t or earlier. The inflation equation we wish to estimate 
is: 
ߨ௧ ൌ ߣݏ௧ ൅ ߚܧ௧ሼߨ௧ାଵሽ 

40 Read more about IV regression in Stock & Watson (2006), chapter 12 
41 For a short introduction to GMM, see Seppo Pynnonen (2007) 
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We are assuming rational expectations, hence the errors of the inflation equation is 
not correlated with information dated at time t and earlier. This gives rise to the 
orthogonal condition, and the expression used for the GMM estimation:  
ܧ௧ሼሺߨ௧ െ ߣݏ௧െߚߨ௧ାଵሻݖ௧ሽ ൌ Ͳ 
, where ݖ௧is a vector of variables dated at time t or earlier, hence uncorrelated to the 
prognosis mistake, the inflation surprise, in period t+1. If two functions are 
orthogonal means that they are independent of each other, and one function cannot be 
used to describe the other function. Thus, given all the information we have at time t, 
captured by the vector ݖ௧ , from time t and earlier, cannot be used to explain the 
prognosis mistake at time t+1, hence given rational expectations the expression above 
is a orthogonal relation and the GMM estimator can be used for testing the NPC.  
 
5.1.3 Deviation from steady state 
All variables in the estimation of the NPC are measured as log-deviations from their 
respective steady state value, where the steady state value is the historical average 
over the period. Each variable has been replaced by the value of the difference 
between the log of the variable value at less the log of the steady state value of the 
variable. Given ݔ௧  is the variable and ݔҧ  is the steady state of the variable, the log-
deviation of the variable from steady state is calculated by42: 
ݔ௧ෝ ൌ ሺݔ௧ሻ െ ሺݔҧሻ 
For small deviations from steady state the log-deviation can be interpreted as 
percentage deviations from steady state, hence their associated coefficients are 
elasticities. The approximation above is only valid for small deviations from steady 
state due to its dependency on calculus as shown below: 
  
௧෢ ൌ ሺݔ௧ሻ െ ሺݔҧሻ ؄
ͳ
ݔ ሺݔ௧ െ ݔሻ ൌ
ݔ௧ െ ݔ
ݔ  

42 Read more about applications of log-deviations in Zietz (2008).  
 ͷʹ
For both the CPI and the long-short interest spread series, the actual deviation of the 
variable from its steady state value has been calculated manually and not by the log-
deviation approximation because of the failure to take logs on negative values.  
 
5.1.4 Comparing non-nested models 
The models used for testing the NPC are non-nested models; hence they are not a 
special case of each other and are therefore not directly comparable. Looking at the R-
squared alone is not the correct approach since it will always increase if more 
variables are added to the regression, thus not showing whether one model is to be 
preferred over another. An approach to compare non-nested models is to use the 
adjusted R-squared in the 2SLS estimation together with the R-squared 43 . The 
adjusted R-squared imposes a penalty if more variables than necessary is included in 
the regression, and is thus indicating whether the increase in the R-squared is valid 
with regards to a better fit model.  
Analyzing the NPC relation is done by using different measures of the instruments 
that make up the expected inflation term in the NPC equation. The three approaches 
in this study are using the survey variables form the time period 2002-2010, and the 
Galí and Gertler variables from the time periods 1996-2010 and 2002-2010. The NPC 
relation to be tested is: 
ߨ௧ ൌ ߣݏ௧ ൅ ߚܧ௧ሺߨ௧ାଵሻ 

43 Read more about comparing non-nested models in Woolridge (2009)  
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5.2 Results 
5.2.1 Survey expectations instruments, 2002-2010 
The first analysis of the NPC relation was executed by using survey expectations as 
instruments for the expected inflation term. The testing using survey variables was 
conducted by using two models of survey expectations, one with all fours sectors in 
the survey, and another test that excluded the household expectations. The motivation 
for making two different instrument sets of survey expectations was to see if the 
results would alter depending on whose expectations that were used as instruments for 
expected inflation. As mentioned earlier, the household sector deviates from actual 
inflation on a larger scale than the other sectors in the survey. The instrument set was 
4 lags of inflation expectations from the economic experts, labor unions, business 
leaders and households. Both 2SLS and GMM was used as estimators, but 2SLS did 
not provide significant results using survey data, thus only the GMM estimates are 
presented.  
The first test using survey expectations use expectations from all four sectors as 
instruments for the expected inflation term.  
 
Table 2: NPC estimates with survey expectations as instruments, 2002-2010 
           (1)       (2) 
VARIABLES ߣ ߚ 
   
 0.0762** 0.958*** 
 (0.0312) (0.0256) 
   
Observations 29 29 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The fit of the instruments are best described by the R-squared, which shows that using 
the survey expectation set that includes all four sectors as instruments explains 87,1 % 
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of the variation in the expected inflation term. This must be considered to be 
satisfying regarding the fit of the instruments. The estimates from the overall NPC 
model, shows that both marginal costs and expected inflation variables are significant 
on a 5 % significance level. The size and sign of the estimates is in line with existing 
literature, and is what we would expect44. The goodness-of-fit regarding the overall 
NPC model is 51,2 %. The estimates of the NPC relation when using survey 
expectations from all four sectors in the survey is therefore:  
 
ߨ௧ ൌ ͲǡͲ͹͸ʹݏ௧ ൅ Ͳǡͻͷͺܧ௧ሺߨ௧ାଵሻ 
 
The second test of the NPC using survey expectations used only three of the sectors as 
instruments for the expected inflation term, namely the economy experts, labor unions 
and business leaders. The inflation expectations from the household sector are left out 
to see whether this will alter the results from table 2.  
 
Table 3: NPC estimates with survey expectations as instruments, households excluded, 2002-2010 
        (1)        (2) 
VARIABLES ߣ ߚ 
   
 0.0972** 0.957*** 
 (0.0392) (0.0312) 
   
Observations 31 31 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Leaving out the household sector reduces the fit of the instruments regarding the 
expected inflation term. The R-squared is reduced to 71 %, but is still considered to 
be satisfying as to explaining the expected inflation term. The overall model fit is 51 

44 See for example Galí and Gertler (1999) 
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% according to the R-squared, which is the same as we saw for the survey model that 
included the household sector.  
The coefficients on both variables are significant on a 5 % level, and the magnitude is 
within what we would expect. The estimates for the NPC using survey expectations 
that excludes household expectations, is thus: 
 
ߨ௧ ൌ ͲǡͲͻ͹ʹݏ௧ ൅ Ͳǡͻͷ͹ܧ௧ሺߨ௧ାଵሻ 
 
The coefficient on expected inflation is nearly identical to the estimated coefficient 
for the model that used everybody in the survey as instruments. The coefficient on 
marginal costs on the other hand, has increased from about 0,076 to 0,097. The 
difference could be considered minor, making the models equivalent. Taking a closer 
look at the overall performance of the instruments show that there is a slight 
preference for the model using everybody in the survey as instruments, as these 
instruments have more explanatory power than the model without the household 
sector regarding the expected inflation term. This is supported by the increase in the 
adjusted R-squared for the two models when all the sectors are included. For the 
overall NPC model on the other hand, the explanatory power is equivalent for the two 
models, making us indifferent between them.  
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5.2.2 NPC without survey instruments, 1996-2010 
As we saw, using survey expectations as instruments in the NPC relation showed that 
the NPC model fits Norwegian data. The results were significant, and in line with 
what we would expect given existing literature on the NPC. It is now interesting to 
see whether the survey instruments make a better fit than the usual way of testing the 
NPC, using the actual future value of inflation and other economic key figures. In the 
following I will present the results from testing the NPC with the instruments used by 
Galí and Gertler in their study in 1999 with minor alterations. Instead of using the 
percentage change in the GDP deflator as a measure of inflation, I use the 12-month 
growth in CPI. I have also used two different measures of the commodity inflation 
variable, namely one with only Norwegian produced goods and one that also includes 
imported goods. I will get back to the difference of using these measures later, and 
will for now present the results using the commodity inflation variable that includes 
both Norwegian produced goods and imported goods. The other instruments used are 
the labor income share, output gap, wage inflation and long-short interest spread. All 
instruments are lagged by four. Neither of the 2SLS estimates in this model gave 
significant results and is therefore left out of the presentation.  
 
The first estimation using the Galí and Gertler instruments consists of observations 
from 1996:1-2010:4.  
Table 4: NPC estimates with Galí and Gertler instruments, 1996 – 2010 
        (1)        (2) 
VARIABLES ߣ ߚ 
   
 0.0576** 0.917*** 
 (0.0259) (0.0278) 
   
Observations 55 55 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The Galí and Gertler instruments show an explanatory power of the expected inflation 
term of 88,7 %. This is only a slightly better fit than using the survey instruments. The 
adjusted R-squared has increased from 36,1 % to 79,2 % compared to the survey, thus 
the increase in the explanatory power, even though the magnitude is small, must be 
considered significant. What is more important is that the explanatory power of the 
NPC relation has increase from 51 % using survey instruments, to 78,9 % using the 
Galí and Gertler instruments. The adjusted R-squared has increased from 47,8 % to 
78,1 %, respectively, thus making the increase in explanatory power significant. The 
increase in the fit of the model must therefore be considered to be both significant and 
of reasonable scale. The NPC estimates given the Galí and Gertler instruments are:  
 
ߨ௧ ൌ ͲǡͲͷͺݏ௧ ൅ Ͳǡͻͳ͹ܧ௧ሺߨ௧ାଵሻ 
 
The estimated coefficients have changed somewhat compared to the estimates from 
the survey instruments. Both the estimated coefficient on marginal costs and the 
expected inflation have decreased by a small amount, but it is still in line with what 
we would expect.  
The scale of the difference between the survey and the Gali and Gertler instruments 
must be considered large. However, there is a weakness in the comparison of the 
results since the survey estimates relies on fewer observations. Also, the Galí and 
Gertler estimation was performed from the period both before and after the monetary 
policy regime changed in Norway, while the survey estimation is only from the period 
after inflation targeting was set in effect. This could influence the results, therefore I 
estimated the NPC using the Galí and Gertler instruments once again, but with 
observations from the period 2002-2010 to match the survey estimates. Again, neither 
of the 2SLS estimates are significant, while all of the GMM estimates are significant.  
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Table 5: NPC estimates with Galí and Gertler instruments, 2002-2010 
        (1)        (2) 
VARIABLES ߣ ߚ 
   
 0.107*** 0.897*** 
 (0.0286) (0.0249) 
   
Observations 31 31 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
In table 5 we see the estimates of the NPC using the Galí and Gertler instruments for 
the shorter time period. The fit of the instruments to the expected inflation term has 
now increased to 98 %, which is nearly a complete fit. Given the adjusted R-squared 
the improvement in fit is legitimate. The fit of the overall NPC model also seems to 
have increased. The adjusted R-squared is now 81 %, which is a slight increase from 
the same test for the longer time period, and a considerable improvement from the 
survey estimates. Given the corresponding increase in the adjusted R-squared shows 
that this is the NPC model that fit the Norwegian data the best. The NPC estimates 
when using the Galí and Gertler instruments for the time period 2002:1-2010:4, is: 
 
ߨ௧ ൌ ͲǡͳͲ͹ݏ௧ ൅ Ͳͺͻ͹ܧ௧ሺߨ௧ାଵሻ 
 
The coefficients have changed somewhat when the period is shortened. The estimate 
of the marginal costs has nearly doubled from the estimates of the longer time period. 
On the other hand, the estimate is fairly close to what we got when we used the 
survey instruments. The estimate of the expected inflation term is close to both the 
one we got from the longer time period, and from the survey.  
  
 ͷͻ
 
5.3 Discussion of the results 
The fit of the NPC theory to Norwegian data has through these tests shown to be 
valid, regardless if we use survey expectations or the Galí and Gertler variables as 
instruments. All tests have shown significant results on the estimated coefficients, and 
the sign and size of the coefficients have been in line with what we would have 
expected. What is more interesting is that using survey expectations as instruments 
show a poorer fit to the NPC model than using the Galí and Gertler instruments, 
which is contrary to findings by Roberts (1995). He found that survey expectations 
made a better fit to the NPC than the use of actual future inflation as a proxy of 
expected inflation45. Comparing the standard errors of his estimates shows that in his 
study, the survey estimates provides a better fit. The standard errors for the survey 
estimates in my study however, are larger than the standard errors using the Galí and 
Gertler instruments, thus making the survey instruments a poorer fit even though they 
are significant estimates. In the following I will go through some possible 
explanations for my findings.  
 
5.3.1 Variability in survey expectations 
The variability in the survey expectations can be one explanation to why the survey 
estimates provide a poorer fit to the expected inflation term than the NPC relation. In 
the analysis I tested both with and without the household sector. Intuitively we would 
expect to see a larger difference in the estimates since household expectations 
deviates more from actual inflation compared to the expectations of the other sectors 
in the survey. The results however proved to be similar, with only a negligible 
preference for the model that did not include the household expectations. This is in 
line with the findings of Roberts (1995). He compared the NPC fit using survey 
expectations from both consumers and the business sector, and did not find significant 
differences between the two46.  

45 Roberts (1995) use only actual future inflation as the instrument in comparison to his survey 
instruments, and is thus not directly comparable to my model. His findings are however relevant, and is 
therefore used as a reference. 
46 Roberts (1995) used the Michigan survey and the Livingston survey in his analysis. The Michigan 
survey goes out to consumers, while the Livingston survey goes out to business economists.  
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One explanation to why using the different sectors do not alter the fit of the NPC in 
my thesis can be that, in general, the inflation expectations in either of the sectors are 
less volatile than actual inflation, as shown in figure 17. The household expectations 
are as we can see on a higher level than the expectations of the other sectors 
throughout the entire period. Nonetheless, the variation in expectations is in general 
low, thus making the household expectations not deviating too far from the other 
sectors.  
The survey expectations do not follow actual inflation in the extremes, even when 
inflation is low (high) over several periods, expectations do not follow the low (high) 
level. This is especially visible for the period where Norway experienced deflation in 
the early second half of 2004.  The inflation expectations during this deflationary 
period were approximately 2-3 % for the period. It should be noted that the 
expectations where formed in the quarter before the actual deflation occurred, but 
given the size and length of the decline, the participants in the survey should have had 
enough time to be able to alter their expectations even if the decline was a result of a 
economic chock that could not have been anticipated on beforehand. We see the same 
behavioral pattern happening in the years leading up to the financial crisis. Given the 
length of the period where we experience the decreasing inflation we would expect to 
see a decrease also in the expected inflation by the survey participants. Again, this did 
not happen. The participants in the survey still expected higher inflation than what 
was the actual level in that period, and the decline was less steep and shorter than the 
decline in actual inflation. 
The lack of volatility in inflation expectations from the survey participants helps 
explain why we did not find significant differences regarding which sector we used in 
the testing of the NPC relation.  
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Figure 17 Actual inflation and inflation expectations from all the sectors in the survey 
 
 
The variation in the Galì and Gertler instruments is following the inflation variability 
more closely, thus the instruments capture more of the variation in the expected 
inflation term. This might be the reason why we find a stronger connection of the Galí 
and Gertler instruments regarding the NPC relation.  
 
5.3.2 The inflation measure 
It is not just the variability in the survey inflation expectations that might affect the 
results, but also the choice of the inflation measure. A possible influencing factor in 
the testing of the NPC in this thesis is that the inflation measure used is the 12-month 
growth in the CPI. The variability in the different inflation measures is presented in 
figure 18, and as we can see the CPI is the most volatile inflation measure.  
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Figure 18: Consumer prices. 12-month change.  January 2003 – February 2011 
 
Source: The Central Bank of Norway47 
 
Given that the inflation expectations from the survey were not very volatile (cf. figure 
17), using the CPI as the inflation measure might influence the results. As shown in 
figure 18 the CPI is more volatile than the other inflation measures, much to the 
reason that energy prices and changes in taxes and interest rates are a part of the CPI 
measure. The inflation measure used by the central bank when deciding on the key 
policy rate is different measures of the underlying inflation, i.e. inflation measures 
that are adjusted for tax changes, interest rate changes and various degrees of 
adjustments considering energy products and prices48. Two measures of underlying 
inflation are the CPI-ATE and CPIXE. As we can see from figure 18, these measures 
are less volatile than the CPI, and would have given an inflation measure that would 
have better reflected the underlying inflation.  

47 Monetary Policy Report 1/11, chart 1.7  
48 Read more about the implementation of monetary policy in the Monetary Policy Report 1/11, or at 
The Central Bank of Norways webpages: www.norges-bank.no 
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In general, the participants in the survey expect inflation that is near the inflation 
target set by the Central Bank of Norway. The poorer fit of the survey expectations 
can be explained by considering that individuals in the economy might not alter their 
expectations much even though inflation deviates in the short run. They still expect 
inflation to be approximately 2,2-3 %, which is within the same range as the inflation 
target set by the central bank. The target of the central bank is inflation of 2,5 % in the 
medium term, thus it looks as if the survey participants are not deviating too much 
from this target.  
Given the above, we must consider the possibility that the expectations of the survey 
participants might not deviate as much from the underlying inflation as it deviates 
from the CPI inflation measure. Figure 18 compared to the survey expectations in 
figure 17 indicates that the survey expectations are more closely linked to CPI-ATE 
and CPIXE than CPI, but since this is not tested we cannot draw any conclusions 
about this relation. It is thus just an indication that the chosen inflation measure in this 
thesis might have influenced the fit of the survey expectations in the NPC relation.  
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5.3.3 Some remarks about the analysis 
Both the 2SLS estimations and the GMM estimations display similar results regarding the 
size of the estimated coefficients.  The GMM estimates however, is the only method that 
provided significant results, and is therefore the chosen estimation method. 2SLS is a simpler 
estimation method, and we can be experiencing errors in the estimation. The estimation 
method 2SLS might experience problems with induced moving average residuals (Bårdsen et. 
al. 2002). This has not been corrected for in this thesis, and might be the reason why the 2SLS 
results are not significant.   
To test the robustness of my results, I included different measures of some of the variables. 
The commodity inflation variable was measured using both Norwegian produced goods only, 
and Norwegian produced goods and imported goods. The result from using the two different 
measures showed that excluding imported goods from the variable made the NPC relation not 
significant when the testing period was 1996:1-2010:4. In the shorter period, the NPC relation 
showed to be significant. When including the imported goods in the commodity inflation 
variable, the NPC proved to be significant on a 5 % level regardless of the length of the time 
period. Given that the NPC failed when altering just one of the instrument variables indicates 
that the NPC relation is not very robust. For the survey I tested the NPC using different 
compositions of the sectors in the survey. The compositions that would most likely make 
different results was using expectations from the household sector and compare it to the 
economy experts. My results showed that the composition of the survey participants had little 
or negligible effect on the overall NPC relation. 
I also conducted tests of the NPC using different amounts of lags on the instrument variables, 
both for the survey and the Galí and Gertler replica. Neither of these tests proved to be 
significant on a 5 % level, thus indicating that my findings are sensitive, and that the results of 
the NPC relation is dependent on which instruments that are included and how many lags that 
are included.  
  
Some studies of the NPC relation include a constant term when estimating the NPC. The 
reason behind including a constant term in the equation is to capture non-zero sample average 
inflation (McAdam and Willman 2003). Although it is not theoretically founded, it can be 
argued for that including a constant term is reasonable as it might account for changes in the 
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steady state inflation (i.e. steady state inflation is not constant). This in turn relies on the 
monetary policy regime. Given that Norway has changed its monetary policy regime during 
the period of my testing of the Galí and Gertler replica, it was interesting to also include 
estimations of the NPC that included a constant term.  
All the estimates were done with and without a constant term in the regression. Models that 
excluded the constant term performed better than its corresponding model without a constant 
term. The R-squared and the corresponding adjusted R-squared, showed that the regressions 
without the constant term made a better fit to the NPC relation than without the constant term. 
The difference in the estimates when including or excluding a constant term was non trivial; 
the estimated of the expected inflation term nearly halved in size and the estimates of the 
marginal costs nearly doubled in size when including a constant term. This can be an 
indication of the fact that the constant term is actually capturing changes in the monetary 
policy regime, and hence the steady state inflation. However, the estimates that did not 
include a constant term were found to have the overall better fit, and were therefore the 
chosen approach for all the models.  
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6 The Conclusion 
The purpose of this thesis has been to estimate the New Keynesian Phillips curve (NPC) 
relation using Norwegian data, and more precisely using survey expectations as instruments 
for the expected inflation term in the NPC. As a comparison to the survey results I have used 
a replication of the Galí and Gertler (1999) estimates, to see whether the survey or the Galí 
and Gertler instruments would provide differing results.  
The first estimation used survey expectations as instruments for the expected inflation term in 
the NPC. The results proved to be significant, and the size and signs of the estimates were in 
line with theory. Estimates on the Galí and Gertler (1999) replica also proved to be 
significant, much as we would expect. More interestingly, the Galí and Gertler replica proved 
to be the preferred model over the survey when deciding on which one had the better fit 
regarding the NPC. The survey expectations estimates, although significant, had a poorer 
model fit than the Galí and Gertler estimates. This is somewhat surprising given that it is 
contrary to the findings of Roberts (1995).  
The Galí and Gertler estimates were based on more observations than the estimates using 
survey expectations. To make sure this was not influencing the results I redid the Galí and 
Gertler estimates using only the observations from the same period as the survey estimates 
were based on. Once again, the conclusion was that the Galí and Gertler estimates were 
superior to the survey estimates regarding model fit.  
Some caution must be taken regarding the estimations. The survey estimates are based on few 
observations, thus we cannot draw strong conclusions. The chosen inflation measure might 
also have influenced the results, as it does not reflect underlying inflation in the same respect 
as for example CPI-ATE or CPIXE. Using a different measure of inflation as the CPI-ATE or 
CPIXE in the NPC could be an interesting subject for further study.  
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Appendix A: Survey questions used in the thesis  
 
For a full review of the survey, see the Central Bank of Norway’s webpages, available at 
URL: http://www.norges-bank.no/no/prisstabilitet/forventningsundersokelse/ 
The particular questions for the different sectors are as follow:  
Economy experts 
Question 1: 
Hva tror du den generelle prisstigningen på varer og tjenester er om 12 måneder, målt ved 12-
månedersveksten i KPI (konsumprisindeksen)? 
 
Labor unions: 
Question 8:  
Hva tror du den generelle prisstigningen på varer og tjenester er om 12 måneder, målt ved 12-
månedersveksten i KPI (konsumprisindeksen)?   
 
Business leaders 
Question 14: 
Hva tror du den generelle prisstigningen på varer og tjenester, målt ved konsumprisindeksen, 
er om 12 måneder? 
 
Households: 
Question 25b:  
Sammenliknet med dagens prisnivå, hvor mange prosent tror du prisene kommer til å stige de 
nærmeste 12 månedene? 
                          
